PROCEEDINGS

James Franklin
Calwell, Catholicism and the Origins of Multicultural Australia

In the middle of 1947, Australia was an Anglophone country with very few immigrants from anywhere except Britain and Ireland. On a wave of “populate or perish” sentiment driven by the Japanese near-invasion five years earlier, it had its first Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell. But despite his energy and ability, few immigrants had arrived, mainly due to shipping problems, and it was unclear where large numbers could come from or how they could get here. He had also promised the Australian people ten British migrants for every non-British one.

At the same time, there were a million “Displaced Persons” (“DPs”) in camps in Western Europe. They were Eastern European anti-Communist refugees who had fled the Red Army and then had avoided being sent back East by the victorious Western allies. They had been surviving in basic camps as an unsolved minor problem of the early Cold War. 60% of them were Catholics (Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Poles, typically).¹

By early 1950, the camps had been burned down, because they were empty. In contrast to the usual persistent failure of the international community to solve refugee problems, all the DPs had been resettled. 180,000 of them were “New Australians”, as Calwell cunningly called them. They constituted some 2% of the Australian population.² Australia had started on the road to multiculturalism and it never looked back.

So what happened? How did the Australian people, without being asked, suddenly find themselves taking in nearly two hundred thousand refugees from countries they had barely heard of and from which there had been virtually no migrants before?

Let us step back and look at the background in three parts: what was happening in Europe where the DPs came from, then the situation in Australia, then the Catholic aspects.

Europe after devastation

In the summer of 1945, central Europe was a very disturbed place, and it looked like staying that way. In hindsight, we know that the Iron Curtain locked into place approximately along the line of the disposition of forces on the day of Hitler’s death, and that Europe to the West of that line quite quickly recovered to a long period of peace, prosperity and democracy. That seemed an unlikely outcome in mid-1945. The thirty years of continuous disasters since 1914 had culminated in the discovery of the Holocaust. There was a power vacuum in central Europe with the collapse of the Nazi regime. Power lay with the Red Army in the East and the Anglo-American army in the West, neither of which was equipped to run civil governments. The Anglo-American army planned to go home as soon as possible. The British, in any case, had run out of money and their new Labour government was full of pro-Soviet sentiment. The Communist parties in the West were very strong and working on seizing power, probably with the aid of the Red Army, which had done the main job of defeating Hitler and was aggrieved that the Anglo-American army had somehow got as far as Berlin and Vienna. Germany was in the grip of famine and its industry and infrastructure were bombed flat. Stalinist regimes were consolidating in Eastern Europe.

There were millions of people in the wrong place, the main groups being forced labourers in German industry and those who had fled West in front of the Red Army’s advance. There was a distinct mass of Jewish refugees, mostly keen to live anywhere except Europe. In 1945 and the few years following, nearly all the Volksdeutsche, the ethnic Germans who had lived in Eastern Europe for centuries, fled or were expelled west; at around 12 million people, it was (and still is) arguably the largest mass movement in history.

In the next two years, 1946 and 1947, the dust cleared and the worst fears for Western Europe were not realised. However, there was not much improvement and things still hung in the balance. It remained very unclear how to find a functioning government in Germany and Italy. Where were there experienced leaders who were neither Communist nor tainted with fascism? The American, British and French zones of Germany were put together as a new “West Germany” despite intense Russian opposition. In Italy, it looked close to certain that the Communist Party would win the election due in 1948 – and at the same time that an isolationist Republican would win the US Presidential election due for the same year, leaving Western Europe with hardly any military or economic protection against Soviet ambitions. Economic revival was proving very slow, in both Europe and Britain, where bread rationing
was introduced, a measure that had never been needed in the War. On top of that, the winter of 1946-7 was horrendous.

So government leaders had a lot on their minds. One problem that nearly slipped off the radar was the remaining mass of refugees in camps in Germany, Austria and Italy. Most of the millions of people displaced by the war were sent home very quickly, sometimes willingly and sometimes not. But with the development of the Cold War, the Western allies quickly lost their appetite for forcibly repatriating anti-Communists refugees to be shot. A million Eastern European refugees thus stayed in camps as an unsolved problem. Jewish refugees were not going to be resettled in Europe either, and advocates for them in the United States agitated to have a homeland found for them. Among many smaller-scale refugee problems, the Polish Second Army Corps of over 100,000 men remained in Italy, armed and keen to invade Poland. ³

In those dark times, it would have been easy to give in to pessimism and repeat the mistakes of the period after the Armistice of 1918. The world could have plunged into another round of the shabby compromises and lost opportunities of the decades between the Wars. Instead there emerged a number of remarkably intelligent and energetic men who collaborated to solve all the main problems and create the peaceful and prosperous democratic West that we live in today. Their leader was Harry Truman, who had become President when Roosevelt died and lacked relevant experience, but quickly worked out which way was up in dealing with Stalin; he was assisted by two very competent Secretaries of State, George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson. He managed to survive isolationist trends to just win the election of 1948, pour money into war-ravaged Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, and contain Communism in Greece, Korea and elsewhere. In Britain, the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and his Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, also ran an anti-Communist line and preserved a British army on the Rhine. In Western Europe, leaders were found among Catholics with solid anti-Fascist credentials: Konrad Adenauer in Germany, Alcide de Gasperi in Italy (who had survived the War in the Vatican Library), and Robert Schuman in France. They had the support of the equally able man in the Vatican who ran its foreign policy, Under-Secretary of State Mgr Giovanni Battista Montini, later Pope Paul VI. By 1950, under their stable leadership and with the help of the Marshall Plan, Western Europe had not only shown

astonishing economic recovery but was embarked on an ambitious plan that would have
looked ludicrous ten or even five years earlier: political unity. The European Coal and Steel
Community was formed, the forerunner of the European Community.

In Australia
Australia had some leaders of the same calibre, men equally determined to make a new,
peaceful and just world out of the wreckage of the past, with a realistic understanding of Cold
War problems and a grasp of the need for international cooperation. Like the Western
European leaders, they were Catholic: Prime Minister Ben Chifley and his Minister for
Immigration and for Information, Arthur Calwell. Australia was of course far from the Cold
War and not capable of playing any major part in it. But it did have one relevant resource:
space. Space was useful in two ways in the Cold War: to test atomic bombs in, and to send
unwanted people to.

Let us go back to survey the Australian scene, especially with regard to immigration.
Australia between the Wars was well out of the mainstream of history, and glad of it. In the
Depression of the 1930s, Australia had a low birthrate but was not keen to supplement the
population with immigration, because of the fear of foreigners taking Australians’ jobs. There
had been a great deal of fuss just before the War about a mere 7000 Jewish “reffos”.

The Labor Party in particular supported immigration restriction, with a certain amount of
simple racism being supplemented by fears of cheap foreign labour. An incident from the
federal election campaign of 1928 is a vivid illustration of the attitudes of those times. The
Labor candidate for the seat of Macquarie in central New South Wales had fought a clean
campaign in 1925, only to see it buried by conservative scares about Labor links with
Communists. In 1928 he fought back with a campaign against the “invasion of 30,000 aliens”
sponsored by the Bruce Government. A stream of “Jugo-Slovakians” and “Czecho Slavs”,
“scabs of the worst kind”, were being brought in to displace Australian workers. A fight
between Dagoes and Australians in Melbourne was a “forerunner of what was likely to
happen in the future unless the stream of these most undesirable immigrants was stemmed”; “Australia was supposed to be a white man’s country, but Mr Bruce and his Government
were fast making it a hybrid.” There were “hundreds of Italians, Jugo-Slavians and Czecho-
Slovakians” working on the Melbourne waterfront, while Australians were left to walk the
streets and their wives and children starved.⁴ The campaign was successful, and that is how Ben Chifley first gained a seat in Parliament.

Australia’s complacency was rudely shattered by the fall of Singapore and the bombing of Darwin, and at the end of the War there was a consensus expressed in the phrase “Populate or perish”: that Australia would have to find white immigrants to strengthen itself against the Asian hordes to the north. As one aspect of vast plans for postwar reconstruction that came to include such high-profile projects as the Snowy Mountains Scheme and the first Holden car (and less happily bank nationalisation), immigration plans on a large scale were announced. Arthur Calwell was appointed Australia’s first Minister for Immigration and vigorously set about finding immigrants. It proved not so easy. While initially there were many Britons keen to come, it was impossible to find shipping. A good proportion of Britain’s merchant navy was at the bottom of the Atlantic where U-boats had put it, while the rest and new ships built were desperately needed to revive Britain’s shattered export industries. What passenger ships were available for migration were not likely to be spared for the long voyage to Australia. Calwell tried many ideas, including a plan for 50,000 child migrants and another to hire an aircraft carrier, but by well into 1947, very little had been achieved. The difficulties of having non-British immigrants were underscored when a single ship, the *Misr*, arrived in Melbourne in April 1947 after a chaotic voyage from Haifa and Mombasa, leading to a media storm about the filthy conditions on board with overtones relating to the somewhat suntanned complexions of the refugees.⁵ If there was to be any more than a trickle of immigrants, someone was going to have to think of something.

Meanwhile back in the camps of Europe, the Displaced Persons’ natural belief that they had fallen down a memory hole proved not to be true. Despite the large number of more major problems occupying the minds of Western leaders, the DP problem received recurrent attention. The Vatican, especially, kept informed about the camps and repeatedly reminded Western governments of the problem. When Justin Simonds, Coadjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, visited Europe on behalf of the Australian bishops in 1946, Montini provided him with a car to tour the camps and see for himself. The Catholic Church also a number of times put forward its teaching that rich countries with space had an ethical obligation to take

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in refugees, and indeed that they had no moral right to refuse to take reasonable numbers. For example Pius XII wrote to the American Catholic bishops in 1948:

You know indeed how preoccupied we have been and with what anxiety we have followed those who have been forced by revolutions in their own countries, or by unemployment or hunger to leave their homes and live in foreign lands.

The natural law itself, no less than devotion to humanity, urges that ways of migration be opened to these people. For the Creator of the universe made all good things primarily for the good of all. Since land everywhere offers the possibility of supporting a large number of people, the sovereignty of the State, although it must be respected, cannot be exaggerated to the point that access to this land is, for inadequate or unjustified reasons, denied to needy or decent people from other nations, provided of course, that the public wealth, considered very carefully, does not forbid this. 6

At some point around the beginning of 1947, the Truman and Attlee administrations reached a number of hard decisions about the Cold War. They included a decision to build a British atomic bomb, which the British economy could ill afford, and to finally name a date for Indian independence. Included was a decision to clean up the Displaced Persons problem once and for all. For the Jewish refugees, the British would give up their opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine and the Jews would go there. The rest, the East Europeans, would be parcelled out to countries around the world, as far as they could be leaned on to take them. Britain itself took a large number, including most of the Polish ex-servicemen. Truman was keen for the United States to do its share, but it was initially impossible because of quotas previously imposed by Congress and it was not until 1948 that a new act made it possible for large numbers to go there. 7 Canada and some South American countries proved reasonably hospitable, helped by their traditions of European immigration. But the British remembered another country, distant certainly and unused to European immigrants, but with plenty of space, prosperity and with a long record as a place to dump people.


Viscount Addison, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, wrote to the Australian High Commissioner urging that Australia sign up to the International Refugee Organisation, the new body tasked with resettling the DPs. Signing carried the implication of taking some of the DPs:

SECRET
DOMINIONS OFFICE
DOWNING STREET
S.W.1

14th March, 1947

Dear Mr. Beasley,

... We are naturally hesitant to appear to be urging the Commonwealth Government to accept additional obligations in the matter of provision for displaced persons, having regard to the extensive plans that they are making for the reception of various classes of immigrants, which, as you know, we very much appreciate, and we fully realise the difficulty which they may feel in accepting any further burdens.

In view, however, of the important considerations in the international sphere referred to in the enclosed memorandum, I should be grateful if you would bring the matter to the notice of your Government in the hope that they will give the fullest consideration to the possibility of signing and accepting the Constitution of the Organisation, which would be a most valuable and appropriate contribution to the re-establishment of political and social security, not only in Europe, but throughout the world. Acceptance does not, of course, involve any commitment on the part of accepting countries to receive immigrants which they do not wish to take.

Sincerely yours,

(sgd.) ADDISON

The request was taken seriously but nothing happened about signing. In May Addison wrote again, not quite so politely:

If it [the IRO constitution] cannot be brought into force within next two or three weeks, it looks as though the whole scheme for an International solution of refugee problem on which we have been working so hard for past eighteen months, might have to be abandoned with most disastrous consequences, not only from social and economical, but even from the political point of view. Indeed, if no solution of refugee problem is found, these unhappy people will constitute a disturbing element which may well prejudice and

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8 Australian Archives, series A698014 item S250104, last (i.e. chronologically first) document.
delay economic, social and political recovery of Europe and constitute a further element of potential friction in a situation which is already quite dangerous enough.9

Australia signed as requested within a fortnight. Calwell visited Europe and on 21 July 1947, signed an agreement with the IRO to take 12,000 Displaced Persons, soon increased to 20,000. With an amazing feat of organisation, the system was put in place and one ship full of refugees, the General Heintzelman, arrived in Melbourne on 28 November.10

That left a number of problems. How were the people to be selected? Where was the shipping to come from? What was to be done with the refugees when they arrived? And last and most awkwardly, how were the Australian people to be persuaded that they would love to take them?

The shipping problem was solved by the Truman administration, which provided half a dozen converted army transports. The reception problem was solved by housing them in converted army camps in Australia and bonding them to work for two years as directed by the government, which made for a convincing case that they were of benefit for national development (and possibly also ensured they didn’t create anti-Labor feeling in marginal electorates before the election of 1949). Calwell believed that the hardest problem lay in keeping public opinion onside. He threw everything into it. Only an old Labor man of the strictest orthodoxy such as himself could have kept the unions on side, always suspicious as they were of immigrant workers – only the Communists objected, with Tribune spouting Moscow’s line about “Calwell’s Balt concentration camp guards”.11 The RSL was persuaded not to worry about which side the refugees had been on during the War.12 The media bought a series of feel-good stories about the benefits of “New Australians” for the Snowy Mountains Scheme. The Sydney Morning Herald’s ‘Young migrants from Baltic

countries revel in Australian outdoors ... first camp wedding ... all fine swimmers’

was exceeded by the Catholic Weekly’s editorial on the “amazing similarity” between the Balts and the Irish (referring not so much to racial characteristics as to their flight to the ends of the earth from the heel of a foreign oppressor). And a great deal of effort was put into carefully selecting the first shiploads of immigrants for their media appeal. The 844 passengers on the General Heintzelman had, by deliberate choice, a very strong bias towards young, blonde, blue-eyed Baltic people (hence mostly Protestant). No Jews. Calwell later wrote in his autobiography:

After deliberating the issue we decided to select a ‘choice sample’ of displaced persons as migrants. We would bring one shipload with nobody under fifteen and nobody over thirty-five, all of whom had to be single. ... Many were red-headed and blue-eyed. There was also a number of natural platinum blondes of both sexes. The men were handsome and the women beautiful. It was not hard to sell immigration to the Australian people once the press published photographs of that group.

When they arrived, Calwell rushed to the dockside to be photographed with them, which made them look even better. They danced fetchingly in national costume for the movie cameras and expressed in excellent though accented English their gratitude for being allowed in such a wonderful country as Australia. Once that was over, the selection criteria were quickly extended without fanfare to include Ukrainians, old people, pretty much anyone without TB.

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13 SMH 17/12/47, p. 2.
14 Editorial: For some New Australians, CW 18/12/47, p. 4; cf. ‘Cardinal urges migration’, SMH 2/10/47, p.3.
16 A.A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not (Melbourne, 1972), p. 103.
Then, just as the program was getting into its stride in 1948, it nearly fell apart. Stalin decided to push the envelope in Europe. He blockaded West Berlin, which was completely surrounded by the Russian-occupied zone of Germany. Because of the extra tension, the Americans secretly ordered that the troop carriers they had loaned should not go into the southern hemisphere in case they were needed to evacuate Europe.  

The crisis blew over as the Americans supplied Berlin by a massive airlift, but in the meantime Calwell had taken a bold step. To affirm Australia’s place as a major player in the Displaced Persons emigration, he took the figure of 20,000 that Australia had agreed to take, and added a zero.  

It seems that that decision was never publicly announced. When things freed up later in 1948, it just happened. With increasing speed, almost all the refugees were selected by the different countries and sent out to their new homes. Australia took more than any country except the

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18 Chifley to Truman, 2/7/48, and Truman to Chifley, 19/7/48, and Calwell’s public statement, 8/7/48, AA A6980/4 item S250105; Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 vol VI p. 3.
United States and more per head of its own population than any country except Israel. Australia’s 180,000 or so were distributed approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poles</th>
<th>60,300</th>
<th>90% Catholic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs</td>
<td>23,300</td>
<td>64% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>57% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>12% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>74% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>74% Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakians</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>80% Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonians</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2% Catholic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>15% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>42% Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>182,200</strong></td>
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**Calwell’s intentions**

What remains not entirely clear is the extent to which Calwell intended to have the effect that his actions actually did have, of creating a multicultural, less than true British, Australia. For obvious reasons, he would not have been revealing any such intentions to the public, if he did have them. There is some evidence, nevertheless.

It is inherently unlikely that Calwell should have been enthusiastic about his promise of 10 Britons for every non-Briton, given for example his arrest during the First World War as a suspected Irish agitator. He had written confidentially to Chifley in 1944 of his “determination to develop a heterogeneous society: a society where Irishness and Roman Catholicism would be as acceptable as Englishness and Protestantism; where an Italian background would be as acceptable as a Greek, a Dutch or any other”. Calwell later acknowledged Chifley’s support, saying “Had we had an anti-immigration man as prime

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minister, or a lukewarm one, we would still be a dull inbred country of predominantly British stock.” 21 (This was in a comment to the Auckland Star newspaper; the New Zealanders could reasonably have taken offence at that as their country took only 5000 DPs.)

Calwell once replied “Yes” to the question, “Do you think that the Australian way of life will suffer any change as a result of the great migration movement?”, 22 and his secretary gave the same answer to the question whether Calwell had intended to change the orientation in Australian society away from a narrowly British mould.23

Some direct evidence of Calwell’s thinking comes from correspondence between him and Montini in 1949, after the displaced persons immigration scheme was well under way. Montini’s letter concludes:

His Holiness prays that Your Excellency’s activity in the field of immigration may continue to open up new avenues of life for the many thousands of people whose future at the moment seems bereft of hope, and, as a token of his paternal benevolence, He imparts to you His Apostolic Blessing.24

It would be possible to regard this as no more than a piece of polite Italianate officialese. On the face of it, the language is far from effusive. That is not how Calwell read it. He wrote requesting a cleaner copy, and distributed copies of it to those in the Catholic Church who had most enthusiastically worked to promote immigration: Mannix, Duhig and others. His covering letter says that the Pope’s words apply to “everyone who like yourself has given such willing and helpful co-operation in the implementation of the plans which have excited the interest and won the commendation of the Supreme Pontiff”. He replied to Montini:

I was deeply touched by the expression of the Supreme Pontiff’s paternal regard when he bestowed His Apostolic Blessing on me and on the work in which I am engaged as Minister of State in the Commonwealth of Australia. It is most gratifying to know that the work of arranging for the settlement of an ever increasing number in Australia of

22 Australasian Post 17/11/49, quoted in Kiernan, Calwell, p. 118
23 Recorded interview with Joan O’Donnell, 15/5/75, quoted in Kiernan, p. 118.
Displaced Persons from European countries meets with such august approval and evokes such touching commendation ... I ask you to accept the assurance that no letter which I have written in the six years in which I have been privileged to hold Ministerial office in this country has given me greater pleasure than this acknowledgement of the Holy Father’s appreciation of my humble efforts in the cause of distressed humanity.  

Calwell’s reaction – or overreaction – to the Pope’s commendation is more significant than Montini’s letter itself. The most difficult thing to know about is Calwell’s private motivation, so the superlatives in which he expresses his pleasure at the Pope’s message are of great interest.

Epilogue #1
In 1964, a brown paper parcel arrived at Calwell’s office. It proved to contain a document from Rome in Latin, of obscure meaning. Translated some time later, it revealed that Calwell was now Knight Commander of the Order of St Gregory the Great with the Grand Silver Star. Though it has no detailed citation, he later heard it was awarded in honour of his general devotion to the Church, the possibility (by then remote) of becoming Prime Minister, and his work on post-war immigration. It was well deserved.

Epilogue #2
In the late 1970s, the Vietnamese government proved itself a typical Stalinist regime. By 1979 50,000 people a month were fleeing in boats and the countries of south-east Asia were starting to tow them back out to sea. The Catholic bishops and B.A. Santamaria, among others, urged Australia to take some. The U.S. State Department organised a solution to the problem, involving bribing the Vietnamese to stop sending them and distributing the refugees to countries willing to take them. Australia signed up for a few thousand, though there was little support in opinion polls. They eventually took a number hard to determine but possibly about 150,000. Sydney became an Asian city.

25 Calwell to Montini, 30/6/49.
26 Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, 159-61.